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        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 14-3018 
___________ 
 
EN SHI WU,  
AKA Guo En Shi, 
     Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
                                                         Respondent  
____________________________________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A089-098-919) 
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Michael W. Straus 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
November 3, 2014 
 
Before:  FUENTES, SHWARTZ and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: December 9, 2014) 
___________ 
 
OPINION* 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 
                                                 
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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 Pro se petitioner En Shi Wu seeks review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ 
(“BIA”) final order of removal.  For the following reasons, we will grant the petition for 
review in part, dismiss it in part, and deny it in part, and we will vacate the BIA’s order  
and remand for further proceedings. 
I. 
 Wu is an ethnic Korean and a citizen of China.  In 2008, she entered the United 
States without inspection and was placed in removal proceedings for failing to possess 
valid entry documents.  In April 2009, Wu conceded her removability before an 
Immigration Judge (“IJ”) and applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief 
under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). 
 After several delays, including a transfer of the case from Texas to New Jersey, 
Wu’s merits hearing before the IJ occurred on March 12, 2012.  Wu asserted that she had 
been persecuted in China due to her political opinion because she and her husband had 
harbored North Korean refugees.  When the refugees were apprehended by the Chinese 
police, Wu and her husband believed that they themselves were unsafe.  Wu and her 
husband fled to another part of China, where they lived for four months until they could 
secure passage to the United States.  Wu believes that she will be punished if she returns 
to China because she harbored North Korean refugees.  
 Wu also alleged that if she returned to China, she would be persecuted because she 
converted to Christianity soon after arriving in the United States.  She attends a non-
denominational Protestant church with a largely Korean congregation.  She testified that 
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she will continue to practice Christianity in China but will not attend a government-
sanctioned church.  Wu testified that she knows of one person who got into trouble after 
joining an underground church in China.  Wu’s pastor testified on her behalf, stating that 
Wu is a devoted Christian and that he believes she would continue her religious activities 
wherever she lives.  In support of her claim, Wu submitted several documents, including 
the United States State Department’s 2009 International Religious Freedom Report for 
China and its 2007 Profile of Asylum Claims and Country Conditions.  
 The IJ denied Wu’s claims for relief.  The IJ first found that Wu had not suffered 
any past persecution, because there was “no evidence that she was ever harmed” due to 
hiding North Korean refugees.  (A.R. at 68.)  The IJ also determined that Wu did not 
establish that she had a well-founded fear of future persecution on account of her hiding 
North Korean refugees, because there was no “basis to indicate that the Chinese 
government in this case ascribed or imputed any sort of political opinion” on Wu.  ( Id. at 
69.) 
 The IJ also rejected Wu’s claim that she was eligible for relief due to a fear of 
future persecution based on her conversion to Christianity.  The IJ determined that the 
background materials indicated that there are “many millions of Chinese who attend 
underground or house churches and that they are treated unevenly throughout the 
country,” (id. at 70), and the IJ “did not see anything specifically to indicate that ethnic 
Koreans going to Korean Protestant churches are specifically targeted in China,” ( id. at 
71).  The IJ determined that there was “simply not enough evidence to show that merely 
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being a Christian and wanting to go to an unregistered Protestant church results in a 
finding that it is more likely than not [Wu] would be persecuted for that.”   (Id.)  
Accordingly, the IJ denied Wu’s claims for asylum and withholding of removal.  The IJ 
also denied Wu’s CAT claim, concluding “that she simply has failed to meet her burden 
of proof that it is more likely than not she would be tortured.”  (Id. at 73.)   
 On appeal to the BIA, Wu, through counsel, challenged only the IJ’s rejection of 
her religion-based claims.  On May 21, 2014, the BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision and 
dismissed Wu’s appeal.  The BIA held that Wu had not demonstrated a reasonable 
possibility that she would be singled out for persecution based on her practice of religion, 
nor had she demonstrated a “systematic, pervasive or organized pattern or practice of 
persecution of Protestants or Christians in China based upon this record.”  (Id. at 3.)  The 
BIA also agreed with the IJ that Wu had not established that she was eligible for CAT 
protection.  
 Wu timely petitioned this Court for review. 
II. 
 We have jurisdiction to review a final order of removal pursuant to 8 U.S.C.  
§ 1252(a)(1).  We generally review only the BIA’s decision, but may look to the IJ’s 
decision insofar as the BIA defers to it.  See Huang v. Att’y Gen., 620 F.3d 372, 379 (3d 
Cir. 2010).  We review an agency’s factual findings, which include its findings as to 
whether a petitioner has demonstrated a well-founded fear of future persecution, for 
substantial evidence.  See Chavarria v. Gonzalez, 446 F.3d 508, 515 (3d Cir. 2006).  
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Under this deferential standard of review, we must uphold those findings “unless any 
reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary.”  8 U.S.C.           
§ 1252(b)(4)(B). 
 The Government argues that Wu has waived her religion-based claims, and that 
she failed to exhaust her claims relating to the North Korean refugees because she did not 
present them to the BIA.  We agree that Wu did not exhaust the latter set of claims; 
therefore, we do not have jurisdiction to consider them.  See Abdulrahman v. Ashcroft, 
330 F.3d 587, 594-95 (3d Cir. 2003) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1)).1  We also agree that 
Wu has waived her religion-based CAT claim by failing to raise it before this Court.  See 
United States v. Pelullo, 399 F.3d 197, 222 (3d Cir. 2005).  However, although Wu’s 
brief is not a model of clarity, under the liberal construction afforded to pro se filings, see 
Higgs v. Att’y Gen., 655 F.3d 333, 339-40 (3d Cir. 2013), we find that she has not 
waived her religion-based future persecution claim. 
 Where, as here, a petitioner seeking asylum does not allege past persecution, she 
must demonstrate a well-founded fear of future persecution.  See Chavarria, 446 F.3d at 
516.  For this fear to be well-founded, it “must be both subjectively and objectively 
reasonable.”  Dong v. Att’y Gen., 638 F.3d 223, 228 (3d Cir. 2011).  “To establish 
objective reasonableness, [a] petitioner[] must show that a reasonable person in [her] 
circumstances would fear persecution if returned to [the country in question].”  Chen v. 
                                                 
1 To the extent that Wu attempts to raise new claims in her submissions to this Court, 
such claims are outside the scope of our review.  See Abdulrahman, 330 F.3d at 594-95.   
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Att’y Gen., 676 F.3d 112, 115 (3d Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted).  To 
satisfy the objective prong, the petitioner must show either that (1) she would be singled 
out for persecution on account of a protected ground, or (2) there is a pattern or practice 
of persecuting similarly situated people on account of a protected ground.  See Lie v. 
Ashcroft, 396 F.3d 530, 536 (3d Cir. 2005).   
 As to Wu’s fear of future persecution due to her religion, the BIA stated that 
“[t]here is no clear error in the [IJ]’s finding that [Wu] has not established that Chinese 
authorities presently are aware of her religious conversion in the United States, or likely 
would become aware of her religious practice after her return to China.”  (A.R. at 3.)  The 
IJ’s decision, however, made no such finding, and the BIA was not permitted to make 
that finding in the first instance.  See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(d)(3)(iv) (“Except for taking 
administrative notice of commonly known facts such as current events or the contents of 
official documents, the Board will not engage in factfinding in the course of deciding 
appeals.”).  Nevertheless, it appears that the BIA mistakenly relied on that purported 
finding when it concluded that Wu “has not demonstrated a reasonable possibility that 
she would be singled out individually for persecution based on her practice of religion 
after her return to China.”  (Id.)  Because a petitioner may prove an objective fear of 
future persecution by demonstrating a pattern or practice of persecution or that she will 
be singled out for persecution, it was necessary that the BIA’s determination as to both 
prongs be supported by substantial evidence.  However, it appears that the BIA based its 
decision concerning whether Wu would be singled out for persecution on its mistaken 
 7 
 
reading of the IJ’s opinion.  While we do apply the harmless error doctrine in 
immigration proceedings, we cannot say that that the BIA’s error in this case was 
harmless.  See Yuan v. Att’y Gen., 642 F.3d 420, 427 (3d Cir. 2011) (holding that an 
error is harmless where it is “highly probably that the error did not affect the outcome of 
the case”).  We will thus vacate the BIA’s final order of removal and remand so that the 
BIA may re-evaluate Wu’s claim that she would be singled out for persecution due to her 
religion.   
 On remand, the BIA need not revisit its finding that Wu did not establish a pattern 
or practice of persecution against Protestants or Christians in China, as substantial 
evidence in the record supports the BIA’s conclusion.  To establish such a claim, a 
petitioner must demonstrate that persecution of the group is “systemic , pervasive, or 
organized.”  Lie, 396 F.3d at 537 (quotation marks omitted).  The evidence in the 
Administrative Record shows that the Chinese government’s treatment of religious 
groups varies by region, and that, in some instances, unregistered churches are quietly 
tolerated by Chinese authorities.  While there are examples of abuse and repression of 
some unregistered churches, we cannot say that the record compels a finding that there is 
a pattern or practice of persecution in China.    
 For the foregoing reasons, we will grant the petition for review in part, dismiss it 
in part, and deny it in part.  We will vacate the BIA’s final order of removal and remand 
for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
